






Brexit: A case  
for optimism?
There was palpable relief when the EU and UK concluded 
the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) on 
Christmas Eve 2020, pulling both sides back from the 
brink of a no-deal cliff edge. But hopes that concluding 
a Brexit deal would mark the beginning of a more 
constructive relationship have faded quickly since.  
The first half of this year was difficult, rife with conflicts 
over the implementation of the Northern Ireland (NI) 
Protocol, fishing rights in Jersey’s waters, and the (now 
resolved) diplomatic status of the EU Delegation to the 
UK. Tensions around the Protocol in particular have 
been seeping into all areas of the EU–UK relationship. 
Furthermore, the new economic settlement has, 
predictably, caused disruption. While the TCA permits 
tariff- and quota-free movement for goods, non-tariff 
measures and rules-of-origin requirements render trade 
more cumbersome and costly. EU exports to and imports 
from the UK dropped respectively by -14.3% and -35.4% 
in the first three months of 2021.1 
 
While friction and conflict are likely to 
feature prominently for quite some time, 
the EU and the UK continue to share many 
global interests, be it on European security, 
multilateralism or global health.
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particularly strong rationale for cooperation regarding 
climate action. The importance of a joint EU–UK climate 
leadership is further heightened by the current global 
context. After the pandemic-induced one-year delay, 
the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties 
(COP26) is finally taking place in the first half of November 
2021, hosted by the UK in Glasgow. There is a unique 
urgency to this COP, which US climate envoy John Kerry 
described as “the last best chance the world has to come 
together […] to avoid the worst consequences of the 
climate crisis.”2
As part of the Paris Agreement’s five-year cycle, all 
countries are required to update their plans for climate 
action, or nationally determined contributions (NDCs), in 
the run-up to COP26. The Conference is a unique window 
for enhanced global ambition, as the US has re-joined 
the Paris Agreement while China has pledged to achieve 
climate neutrality by 2060. 
The EU and UK should use this opportunity to 
strategically – and jointly – push for increased global 
ambition. Both have enhanced their NDCs: compared to 
their respective 1990 levels, the EU commits to at least a 
-55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, and 
the UK to at least a -68% reduction. However, more efforts 
will be required, particularly in terms of supporting 
developing countries to reduce their emissions. As UN 
Secretary-General António Guterres warns, “The world 
remains way off target in staying within the 1.5-degree 
limit of the Paris Agreement”.3
The EU and UK have a shared interest in a triumphant 
COP and persuading other countries, particularly heavy 
polluters, to follow their climate policies. For this to 
succeed, both parties must be seen as credible climate 
leaders who are heading in the same direction and able  
to show others the way. 
The urgency of the climate challenge and alignment of 
interest make COP26 a unique testbed for the EU’s and 
UK’s ability to shape and raise global ambition jointly. 
However, despite the overwhelming rationale, there are 
signs that the cooperation is not going as smoothly as 
it should, with both sides struggling to (fully) insulate 
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What are the opportunities and limitations of EU–UK 
climate cooperation post-Brexit? As the partnership’s 
new basis, can the TCA be conducive for closer climate 
cooperation and growing ambitions? How are the EU and 
UK working together in the run-up to COP26, set to be an 
important test case for a joint EU–UK climate agenda? 
BACKGROUND: THE BREXIT DEAL’S AMBITION 
FOR CLIMATE COOPERATION WON’T SUFFICE
The TCA is a thin deal that broadly outlines how both 
parties will trade (goods) with each other, leaving gaps in 
many areas of previous cooperation. Case in point, there 
is no mobility chapter nor formal cooperation on foreign 
policy, while provisions on services are limited. The deal’s 
sparseness resulted from both sides’ firm red lines, the 
unusually short negotiating timeframe, and the UK’s 
primacy of political over economic concerns. 
While the TCA is less deep and comprehensive than 
was envisioned in the Political Declaration, it reflects 
both sides’ proximity and interconnectedness. Its level 
of binding obligations as well as recognition of shared 
challenges also indicate the size of the UK’s economy.  
The TCA’s preamble acknowledges the importance of global 
cooperation to address shared interests, including climate 
action. Furthermore, the Agreement explicitly recognises 
climate change as an existential threat to humanity.  
Importantly, the fight against climate change is identified 
as one of the partnership’s essential elements, alongside 
democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Its 
classification as “essential” implies that a “serious and 
substantial failure” in this area by either party could 
lead to the TCA’s suspension or (partial) termination. 
Non-compliance with the Paris Agreement, as in “an 
act or omission which materially defeats [its] object and 
purpose”, is explicitly considered to be such a failure.4 
Although an arguably high threshold, it clearly places 
climate change at the core of a shared EU–UK agenda.  
However, while climate commitments in the TCA go 
further than in the EU’s other free trade agreements, 
signalling a clear prioritisation, four important caveats 
are to be made. 
First, the TCA’s scope of application might be limited 
by its strong emphasis on the trade-related aspects of 
climate change. For example, non-regression clauses 
prevent either party from weakening or reducing their 
environmental or climate protection “in a manner 
affecting trade or investment” as of the end of 2020.5 
Environmental groups have criticised this “trade and 
investment test”, pointing out that the impact might  
be difficult to prove, potentially rendering the  
provisions ineffective.6
Second, the TCA focuses on reaffirming existing 
ambitions, such as achieving economy-wide climate 
neutrality by 2050 or maintaining levels of protection 
that were in place at the end of the transition period. 
Here, the TCA contains some innovative elements, 
particularly on the enforceability of non-regression  
by allowing temporary remedial measures. While 
significant, these provisions are about preventing a  
race to the bottom. In other words, to avoid falling  
below standards that are clearly insufficient to reach  
the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming  
to below 2°C. 
Whether the TCA can also be a tool to raise joint 
ambitions is doubtful. A possibility would be via the novel 
rebalancing mechanism, which allows either side to take 
“proportionate” measures to offset any “material impacts 
on trade or investment” resulting from “significant 
divergences” between the two parties.7 In theory, this 
means that neither side should refrain from raising its 
standards from fear of competitive disadvantages. In 
practice, the use of unilateral and harsh measures could 
lead to a tit-for-tat tariff escalation, with definitively 
negative consequences for cooperation overall and 
the possibility of “perpetual wrangling and bad feeling 
between the UK and the EU.”8
Third, the TCA’s proposals for continued cooperation 
might not be adopted as they depend on political will, 
which is lacking – particularly on the part of the current 
British government. For instance, the TCA encourages 
both parties to cooperate on carbon pricing and “give 
serious consideration to linking their respective carbon 
pricing systems”.9 From a technical perspective, linking 
the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) with the 
newly launched UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) 
would have many advantages. It would increase market 
liquidity and price stability, level the international 
playing field, avoid competitive distortions, and lower 
the costs of achieving the mutual objective of net-zero 
emissions. On these grounds, over 40 EU and UK industry 
bodies signed joint letters to the European Commission 
and UK government, urging them to pursue such a link in 
the run-up to COP26 as soon as possible.10 
 
Certain conditions are implicit in such linking (i.e. system 
compatibility, mandatory systems, an absolute cap on 
emissions), implying that it would come with certain 
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limitations to the UK’s policy autonomy. A tepid statement 
by the UK government – “no decision on our preferred 
linking partners has yet been made”11– suggests that its 
political will to link to the EU’s system is lukewarm.
Although currently fairly similar, dynamics on the EU side 
(e.g. plans to reform and expand its sectoral coverage), 
as well as the UK’s post-Brexit focus on regulatory 
autonomy, imply that the ETS systems’ compatibility 
might decrease over time, rendering linkages less likely. 
While there is a clear cooperation rationale, the primacy 
of British concerns about regulatory autonomy makes it 
unlikely that the TCA’s provisions for enabling continued 
cooperation will bear fruit.
Fourth, the TCA is ambitious in its language but fails 
to offer any concrete mechanisms and/or platforms for 
coordinating and driving joint ambition. While both 
parties commit to cooperating in multilateral fora and 
implementing multilateral environmental agreements, 
the document’s focus is, again, on cooperation on trade-
related aspects of climate change. The TCA also created 
an intricate governance structure, including a Partnership 
Council and multiple technocratic committees and 
working groups. But there is no new political mechanism 
for cooperation, which is needed given that the pre-Brexit 
ones under EU membership are no longer available.  
 
The Brexit deal is ambitious in its language 
but fails to offer any concrete mechanisms 
and/or platforms for coordinating and 
driving joint EU–UK ambition.
 
 
Overall, the TCA’s innovations and ambitious language on 
climate action set a relevant precedent for EU trade policy. 
However, in driving ambition and creating spaces and/or 
tools to coordinate long-term trajectories and strategies 
between both parties, including in the run-up to COP26, 
the new climate cooperation partnership falls short.  
STATE OF PLAY: BREXIT’S SHADOW OVER 
COP26
The toxicity of Brexit has evidently seeped into all 
areas of EU–UK cooperation, including globally shared 
interests. The latest example is the G7 summit, hosted by 
Prime Minister Johnson in Cornwall in June. While not 
an official G7 agenda item, the tensions around the NI 
Protocol largely overshadowed the summit, and thus the 
first outing of ‘Global Britain’ on the world stage. 
Cornwall demonstrated that Johnson has no intention of 
insulating EU–UK cooperation on global issues from the 
politics of Brexit. It also shows the continuation of the 
very same tactics that caused trust to break down in the 
first place: threats and provocations, such as unilateral 
actions or the suggested triggering of NI Protocol Article 
16, to extract concessions from the EU (as well as play 
to the UK public). Once again, this approach is likely to 
achieve the opposite. As a community of rules and laws, 
the EU will only show flexibility if and when it is assured 
that the UK will implement what has been signed in good 
faith – not the other way around. 
In this high-friction, low-trust context, the TCA’s 
mechanisms risk being politicised, possibly leading 
to severe economic penalties and a tit-for-tat tariff 
escalation. The prospect of further escalation and even 
a trade war does not bode well for EU–UK cooperation 
overall, and consequently COP26. How can the EU and 
UK formulate and pursue joint strategies to raise overall 
ambition at the Conference and beyond, as long as both 
view the other with great suspicion? The UK suspects that 
the EU does not want it to succeed post-Brexit, while the 
EU is increasingly doubtful of Johnson’s trustworthiness.  
 
This is not to say that the EU and UK are not coordinating 
their preparations for Glasgow. On a technical level, there is 
a regular exchange, including at the highest working level, 
where European Commission Executive Vice-President for 
the European Green Deal Frans Timmermans and COP26 
President Alok Sharma are said to have a good working 
relationship. However, cooperation on both the technical 
and political levels will be needed to stay on the right track 
of keeping the Paris Agreement goal within reach. 
Currently, the UK’s COP presidency is the primary 
channel of interaction between the two parties. While 
more political cooperation is needed, this also raises 
more general questions about how the EU and UK will 
communicate in the international climate space post-
COP26. This question is “kind of on hold at the moment 
because of the UK’s additional responsibilities”12 but will 
resurface in the future. 
Usually, global climate negotiations are conducted 
through groupings of countries, of which the EU is one.  
It is unclear which negotiating bloc the UK will join after 
its COP presidency.13 Given the UK’s current opposition to 
any form of (institutionalised) cooperation with the EU, it 
is not expected to show any appetite to join some form of 
‘EU-plus’ group. The current government might be more 
inclined to join the Umbrella Group of industrialised 
countries: Australia, Belarus, Canada, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and the US. This likelihood reinforces 
the need for a space where the EU and UK can work 
together systematically. 
PROSPECTS: A TRANSATLANTIC  
CLIMATE ALLIANCE?
The TCA’s emphasis on shared interests – which put 
climate change at the core of the EU–UK global agenda in 
the first place – came with the hope that it would open up 
new avenues of cooperation, enabling both sides to start 
rebuilding trust. However, with less than five months to 
go until COP26, the political will to build on the TCA’s 
ambitious language jointly is missing.
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New avenues of cooperation? 
For now, the EU has to take note of a UK government that 
will continue to reject any form of structured cooperation 
with EU institutions and, even worse, benefits from fuelling 
the friction. To still have a chance of coordinating (more) 
effectively, the EU should consider proposing a structure 
that goes beyond the bilateral EU–UK relationship. 
For example, both sides might want to coordinate the 
European position with the US and even other interested 
third countries. Such a transatlantic triangulation could be 
an easier political pill for the UK government to swallow 
and help allay its ideological concerns. 
With the momentum of the pro-climate (and pro-
European) Biden administration and the UK’s desire to be 
seen as a significant global player, a triangular structure 
on climate could be difficult for Johnson to turn down. 
The UK is excluded from the EU’s and US’ intensified 
efforts to set a Joint Transatlantic Agenda for the post-
pandemic era, including their recent commitment to 
establish an EU–US High-Level Climate Action Group and 
Transatlantic Green Technology Alliance. EU reluctance 
to elevate the UK to the same level as the US is misplaced, 
given the former’s relative size and importance. 
Investing in trust-building in all governance levels 
There clearly is a need to invest in trust-building. This will 
be difficult as long as Johnson benefits from the EU–UK 
relationship being bumpy and conflictual. Nonetheless, 
the EU should focus more on the subnational level and 
promote relations between sub-state actors on both sides, 
such as devolved administrations, regions and cities, civil 
society, academia and think tanks. 
 
Particularly in climate action, subnational actors play 
an increasingly important role in exerting pressure and 
building transnational networks to increase their critical 
mass and exchange best practices. Given the disruptive 
nature of Brexit, nurturing subnational links could be 
a win-win for climate action and rebuilding and/or 
maintaining trustful EU–UK relations. 
There are plenty of examples of deep and structured 
subnational relations upon which to lean. For instance, 
the State of California signed 63 bilateral agreements 
with different transnational actors, 15 of which are 
European, covering areas like energy, transportation and 
urban infrastructure.14 Subnational actors in the EU and 
UK could benefit from investing in similar agreements.
No time to lose
Climate action is an area with an overwhelming rationale 
for EU–UK cooperation. Despite the reasonably strong 
collaboration at the working level, strategic cooperation 
on the political level is still lacking. Recent events, such 
as the G7 summit, show that the EU and UK risk getting 
caught up in a web of mutual suspicion and distrust, 
thereby impeding joint global leadership. It is unlikely 
that the relationship will enter calmer waters in the 
five months leading to COP26. But as argued by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, we have 
less than a dozen years to curb climate catastrophe, and 
this COP will be crucial in laying the right tracks. 
The EU should use its current momentum with the US to 
mobilise a triangular climate alliance and not leave the 
UK out of their plans to establish a High-Level Climate 
Action Group. While they might not see eye to eye on 
every detail, the three parties broadly want the same 
when it comes to climate – and an unsuccessful COP 
would be bad news for all.
This Policy Brief is part of the joint project, “EU–UK climate 
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